Godel's Second Incompleteness Theorem for Definable Theories by Seraji, Payam & Chao, Conden
ar
X
iv
:1
60
2.
02
41
6v
3 
 [m
ath
.L
O]
  3
0 A
pr
 20
16
Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem for
Σn-definable theories
Conden Chao∗
Payam Seraji†
May 3, 2016
Abstract
Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem is generalized by showing that if the set
of axioms of a theory T ⊇ PA is Σn+1-definable and T is Σn-sound, then T dose not
prove the sentence Σn-Sound(T ) that expresses the Σn-soundness of T . The optimal-
ity of the generalization is shown by presenting a Σn+1-definable (indeed a complete
∆n+1-definable) and Σn−1-sound theory T such that PA ⊆ T and Σn−1-Sound(T ) is
provable in T . It is also proved that no recursively enumerable and Σ1-sound theory
of arithmetic, even very weak theories which do not contain Robinson’s Arithmetic,
can prove its own Σ1-soundness.
Keywords: Go¨del’s second incompleteness, Σn-definable, Σn-sound, Σn-Sound,
strong provability predicate
1 Introduction
Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem states that for any recursively enumerable and
sufficiently strong (say any extension of Peano’s Arithmetic PA) theory T , T 6⊢ Con(T ),
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where Con(T ) is the arithmetical sentence expressing the the consistency of T (see e.g.
[2, 3, 9, 10]). This consistency statement is usually built from a “provability predicate”
such as Con(T ) =df ¬PrT (p⊥q), where PrT satisfies the derivability conditions:
D1: if T ⊢ φ then T ⊢ PrT (pφq),
D2: T ⊢ PrT (pφ→ ψq)→ [PrT (pφq)→ PrT (pψq)], and
D3: T ⊢ PrT (pφq)→ PrT (pPrT (pφq)q).
A natural question that comes to mind is that what happens to Go¨del’s second incomplete-
ness theorem for non-recursively enumerable theories? For considering the phenomenon
of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem for general (not necessarily recursively enumer-
able) theories T , we should be able to write down Con(T ) or equivalently PrT (noting that
PA ⊢ PrT (pφq)↔ ¬Con(T + ¬φ) for any formula φ); thus we can only consider definable
theories. Let us note that if the provability predicate of a definable theory T satisfies the
derivability conditions then it can be shown that T cannot prove its consistency by the
usual argument.
But if PrT does not satisfy the derivability conditions, then Go¨del’s second incomplete-
ness theorem may not hold anymore; see [6, pp. 263–264] for an example of a consistent
∆2-definable extension of PA which proves its own (standard) consistency statement (Sec-
tion 5 of [7] contains a more modern treatment). So, the derivability conditions may not
hold for definable theories in general, even if they are sufficiently strong, e.g. contain
PA, for the reason that PrT is not then necessarily a Σ1-formula, so D1 or D3 above may
not hold anymore. One of the earliest instances of Go¨del’s second incompleteness the-
orem for non-recursively enumerable (but definable) theories is Jeroslow’s Theorem 6 in
[6, p. 264] stating (in an equivalent rewording) that ∆2-definable extensions of PA cannot
prove their own Σ2-soundness, provided that they are Σ1-sound (cf. [5] for the equivalence
of definitions) and satisfy some further technical conditions.
A theory is called Σn-sound if it cannot prove a false Σn-sentence. For any theory T ,
and any n ∈ N, the Σn-soundness of T is equivalent to its consistency with Πn-Th(N),
the set of all true Πn-sentences (see [8] for the notation). For simplicity we will write
Σn-Sound(T ) instead of Con(T ∪ Πn-Th(N)). Here we will show that Go¨del’s second
incompleteness theorem holds for Σn+1-definable and Σn-sound theories, in the sense
that if T is a Σn+1-definable and Σn-sound theory containing PA, then T dose not prove
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Σn-Sound(T ) (Theorem 4 below). This result is a bit stronger than a version which
follows quickly from the well-known facts about, the so called, strong provabilty predicates
(Theorem 2 below). We will also show the optimality of this result by presenting a Σn+1-
definable (indeed complete ∆n+1-definable) Σn−1-sound extension of PA which proves its
own Σn−1-soundness.
2 Generalized Go¨del’s second incompleteness theo-
rem
A theory T is definable when there exists a formula AxiomT (x) such that for every
natural number n, AxiomT (n) holds just in case n is the Go¨del number of an axiom of T .
The formula ConjAxT (x) indicates that x is the Go¨del number of a formula which is the
conjunction of some axioms of T . Let Proof(y, x) be the proof relation in first-order logic,
saying that y is the Go¨del code of a proof of a formula with Go¨del number x. Thus, the
consistency of a definable theory T , i.e., Con(T ), can be written as
∀s, u
[
ConjAxT (s)→ ¬Proof(u, ps→ ⊥q)
]
.
So, we can write Σn-Sound(T ) =df Con(T ∪Πn-Th(N)) as
∀s, t, u
[
ConjAxT (s) ∧ Πn-True(t)→ ¬Proof(u, ps ∧ t→ ⊥q)
]
,
where the formula Πn-True(x) defines the set Πn-Th(N). We call a theory T an extension
of PA if N  ∀x
[
AxiomPA(x) → AxiomT (x)
]
, where AxiomPA is a ∆0-formula defining
the set of axioms of PA. T is an explicit (or provable) extension of PA when we have
PA ⊢ ∀x
[
AxiomPA(x)→ AxiomT (x)
]
.
For each n ∈ N, let Pr(n+1)(x) be the provability predicate of theory T = PA +
Πn-Th(N). The predicate Pr
(n+1)(x) is an example of a strong provability predicate of
degree n+ 1 (cf. Definition 2.1 of [4]) which means it satisfies the following conditions:
C1: Pr
(n+1)(x) ∈ Σn+1;
C2: PA ⊢ Pr
(n+1)(pφ→ ψq)→
[
Pr
(n+1)(pφq)→ Pr(n+1)(pψq)
]
for every φ, ψ;
C3: PA ⊢ φ→ Pr
(n+1)(pφq) for every φ ∈ Σn+1;
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C4: if N |= Pr
(n+1)(pφq) then N |= φ for every φ ∈ Σn+1;
C5: if PA ⊢ φ then PA ⊢ Pr
(n+1)(pφq) for every φ.
Using these properties, it can be proved that Pr(n+1)(x) satisfies the Lo¨b axiom (The-
orem 2.2 of [4]), which is PA ⊢ Pr(n+1)(pPr(n+1)(pφq) → φq) → Pr(n+1)(pφq) (for any
sentence φ), and it immediately implies that
Theorem 1. For each n ∈ N, the theory T = PA + Πn-Th(N) can not prove its own
consistency.
Proof. Let φ = ⊥ in the Lo¨b’s axiom.
This result can be a bit generalized by the following observation. Let T ⊇ PA to be a
Σn+1-definable theory which does not necessarily contain all Πn-Th(N), but it is Σn-sound
and T is also an explicit extension of PA. The Σn-soundness of T implies that the theory
T ∗ = T + Πn-Th(N) is consistent. Let PrT ∗ to be the provability predicate of T
∗. It can
be easily checked that PrT ∗ satisfies the properties C1, C2 and C5 for a strong provability
predicate of degree n+ 1. By Proposition 2.11 of [1] for every σ ∈ Σn+1 we have
PA ⊢ σ → ∃s, t, u
[
ConjAxPA(s) ∧ Πn-True(t) ∧ Proof(u, ps ∧ t→ σq)
]
.
Thus
PA ⊢ σ → ∃s, t, u
[
ConjAxT (s) ∧Πn-True(t) ∧ Proof(u, ps ∧ t→ σq)
]
(because PA ⊢ ∀x
[
AxiomPA(x) → AxiomT (x)
]
). Hence PA ⊢ σ → PrT ∗(pσq) for any
σ ∈ Σn+1, so PrT ∗ also satisfies the property C3 for a strong provability predicate of
degree n + 1. A close inspection of Theorem 2.2 of [4] (which proves the Lo¨b’s axiom)
reveals that the property C4 is not used in its proof, so the predicate PrT ∗ also satisfies
the Lo¨b’s axiom which is the formalized Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem. So
T ∗ 0 Con(T ∗). But Con(T ∗) is exactly Σn-Sound(T ), hence Σn-Sound(T ) is not provable
in T ∗ and then in T . So we have proved the following result which is a generalization of
Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem for definable theories, noting that for extensions
of PA, Σ0-soundness is equivalent to consistency (Theorem 5 of [5]); thus Go¨del’s second
theorem is the following theorem for n = 0.
Theorem 2. For any Σn+1-definable and Σn-sound theory T which is an explicit extension
of PA, i.e. PA ⊢ ∀x[AxiomPA(x)→ AxiomT (x)], we have T 6⊢ Σn-Sound(T ).
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We will show that this result holds even if ∀x[AxiomPA(x)→ AxiomT (x)] is not neces-
sarily provable in PA (Theorem 4 below). At first we need a few lemmas. The first one is
a generalization of Craig’s trick.
Lemma 1. For any n ∈ N, if a theory T is definable by a Σn+1 formula, then it is also
definable by a Πn formula.
Proof. Let the Σn+1 formula AxiomT (x) = ∃x1 · · · ∃xmψ(x, x1, · · · , xm) define the set of
axioms of T (with ψ ∈ Πn). This formula is logically equivalent to the formula ∃yδ(x, y) =
∃y∃x1≤y · · · ∃xm≤yψ(x, x1, · · · , xm). Note that δ(x, y) ∈ Πn. So the set of sentences Ω =
{φ ∧ (k = k) | N  δ(pφq, k)} also axiomatizes T . Clearly the Πn formula AxiomT ′(x) =df
∃y ≤ x∃z ≤ x[δ(y, z) ∧ (x = py ∧ (z = z)q)] defines Ω.
Let Σn-Sound(T
′) be the sentence asserting the Σn-soundness of the theory T
′ which
is defined by the formula AxiomT ′(x) as above, i.e.
Σn-Sound(T
′) = ∀s, t, u
[
ConjAxT ′(s) ∧ Πn-True(t)→ ¬Proof(u, ps ∧ t→ ⊥q)
]
.
Lemma 2. PA ⊢ Σn-Sound(T )↔ Σn-Sound(T
′)
Proof. (Working in PA) For any formula φ, AxiomT (pφq) if and only if AxiomT ′(pφ∧z = zq)
for some suitable z. Obviously the set of logical consequences of A = {φ | AxiomT (pφq)}
and logical consequences of Ω = {φ | Axiom′T (pφq)} are the same. Hence they prove same
sentences of the form χ→ ⊥ where χ is a (conjunction of) true Πn sentences. Therefore,
A+Πn-True(N) is consistent if and only if Ω + Πn-True(N) is consistent.
Lemma 3. PA + Σk-Sound(T ) ⊢ Σk-Sound(T + φ) ∨ Σk-Sound(T + ¬φ) holds for any
formula φ and any k ∈ N and any definable theory T .
Proof. Reason inside PA+ Σk-Sound(T ): if (on the contrary we have)
¬Σk-Sound(T + φ) and ¬Σk-Sound(T + ¬φ)
then there are s′, t′, u′, s′′, t′′, u′′ ∈ N such that
ConjAxT (s
′) ∧ Πk-True(t
′) ∧ Proof(u′, ps′ ∧ t′ → φq) and
ConjAxT (s
′′) ∧Πk-True(t
′′) ∧ Proof(u′′, ps′′ ∧ t′′ → ¬φq).
Then for s = s′ ∧ s′′, t = t′ ∧ t′′ and a suitable u we have
ConjAxT (s) ∧Πk-True(t) ∧ Proof(u, ps ∧ t→ ⊥q),
which implies ¬Σk-Sound(T ), contradiction.
5
Theorem 3. For any Πn-definable and Σn-sound theory T extending PA, we have that
T 6⊢ Σn-Sound(T ).
Proof. Let T ∗ = T ∪ Πn-Th(N) which is a consistent theory by the assumption of Σn-
soundness of T . By the diagonal lemma there exists a sentence γ such that PA ⊢ γ ↔
Σn-Sound(T + ¬γ).
Firstly, we show T 6⊢ γ even more T ∗ 6⊢ γ: since otherwise (if T ∗ ⊢ γ) there would
exists some s, t, u ∈ N such that ConjAxT (s)∧Πn-True(t)∧Proof(pu, s∧ t→ γq) is a true
(Πn-)sentence. Since all true Πn-sentences are provable in Πn-Th(N) (and so in T
∗) then
we would have T ∗ ⊢ ¬Σn-Sound(T + ¬γ) thus T
∗ ⊢ ¬γ, contradiction.
Secondly, we prove T ∗ ⊢ Σn-Sound(T + γ) → γ: note that by Proposition 2.11 of [1]
for every σ ∈ Σn+1 we have
PA ⊢ σ → ∃s, t, u
[
ConjAxPA(s) ∧ Πn-True(t) ∧ Proof(u, ps ∧ t→ σq)
]
.
Thus
T ∗ ⊢ σ → ∃s, t, u
[
ConjAxPA(s) ∧Πn-True(t) ∧ Proof(u, ps ∧ t→ σq)
]
. (1)
Since ∀x(AxiomPA(x)→ AxiomT (x)) is a true Πn sentence and Πn-Th(N) ⊆ T
∗,
T ∗ ⊢ ∀x(AxiomPA(x)→ AxiomT (x)) (2)
(1) together with (2) implies that
T ∗ ⊢ σ → ∃s, t, u
[
ConjAxT (s) ∧ Πn-True(t) ∧ Proof(u, ps ∧ t→ σq)
]
. (3)
So T ∗ ⊢ σ → ¬Σn-Sound(T+¬σ) for any σ ∈ Σn+1. It suffices now to note that ¬γ ∈ Σn+1
thus T ∗ ⊢ ¬γ → ¬Σn-Sound(T + γ), hence T
∗ ⊢ Σn-Sound(T + γ)→ γ.
Thirdly, we show T ∗ ⊢ Σn-Sound(T )→ γ. By Lemma 3 we already have
T ∗ + Σn-Sound(T ) ⊢ Σn-Sound(T + γ) ∨ Σn-Sound(T + ¬γ),
and so by the definition of γ (T ⊢ Σn-Sound(T + ¬γ) → γ) and the second point above
(T ∗ ⊢ Σn-Sound(T + γ)→ γ) we can conclude that T
∗ ⊢ Σn-Sound(T )→ γ.
Finally, if T ⊢ Σn-Sound(T ) then by the third point above T
∗ ⊢ γ contradicting the
first point above.
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Theorem 4. For any Σn+1-definable and Σn-sound theory T extending PA, we have T 6⊢
Σn-Sound(T ).
Proof. Let AxiomT ′(x) to be the Πn formula defining T
′ (constructed in Lemma 1) which
is equivalent to the theory T . By Lemma 2, PA ⊢ Σn-Sound(T ) ↔ Σn-Sound(T
′) and by
the previous theorem T ′ 0 Σn-Sound(T
′), therefore T 0 Σn-Sound(T ).
Remark 1. In the above arguments PA can be replaced, everywhere, either with the
theory I∆0 + Exp (the fragment of PA in which the induction scheme is restricted to ∆0-
formulas plus the axiom of totality of the exponential function, see e.g. [3]), or with the
theory EA (the elementary arithmetic, see e.g. [1]), since it is well-known that I∆0 + Exp
and EA are definitionally equivalent.
For any recursively enumerable and Σ1-sound theory T in the language of arithmetic
augmented with a symbol for exponential function (even very weak theories that dose not
contain the Robinson’s arithmetic), we can prove the following theorem as a corollary.
Theorem 5. If the function symbol exp (with its standard interpretation) is in the lan-
guage of a recursively enumerable and Σ1-sound theory T , then T 6⊢ Σ1-Sound(T ).
Proof. Let T ∗ = T ∪ Π1-Th(N). By the Σ1-soundness of T the theory T
∗ is consis-
tent and contains EA (or equivalently I∆0 + Exp since both EA and I∆0 + Exp are Π1-
axiomatizable in the presence of exp). So, Proposition 2.11 of [1] implies that T ∗ ⊢
σ → ∃s, t, u
[
ConjAxT (s) ∧ Π1-True(t) ∧ Proof(u, ps ∧ t → σq)
]
(for any Σ2 sentence σ).
Thus, by an argument similar to the previous theorem, T ∗ 6⊢ Σ1-Sound(T ) which implies
T 6⊢ Σ1-Sound(T ).
3 Optimality of the Go¨del’s second incompleteness
theorem
In this section, we construct, for any n > 0, a Σn+1-definable and Σn−1-sound theory
T such that T ⊢ Σn−1-Sound (T). Fix a natural number n > 0 throughout this section
unless otherwise noted. The formula Seq(m) says that m is the code of a sequence of
formulas, and the length of this sequence is denoted by ℓ(m), and for any number l<ℓ(m)
the lth member of m is denoted by [m]l. A sequence m is thus 〈[m]0, [m]1, · · · , [m]ℓ(m)−1〉.
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Definition 1. Fix an enumeration χ0, χ1, χ2, · · · of all the formulas such that (by the
convention) χ0 = Con(T0), where T0 = PA ∪ Πn−1-Th(N). We construct T by recursions.
T0 = PA ∪ Πn−1-Th(N);
Ti+1 =


Ti + χi if Ti is consistent with χi,
Ti + ¬χi otherwise;
T =
⋃
i∈N Ti.
We will show that T is the desired theory in four steps.
Lemma 4. Let T be defined as above, then
(1) T is consistent and Σn−1-sound;
(2) T is Σn+1-definable.
Proof. (1) is trivial, and so we just prove (2). Let ConT0(x) be defined as
∀s, t, u
[
ConjAx
PA
(s) ∧Πn−1-True(t)→ ¬Proof (u, ps ∧ t ∧ x→ ⊥q)
]
,
and put Compl (y), meaning that y is a (partial) completion of T0, be the formula
Seq(y)∧∀j <ℓ(y)
[[
ConT0
(
χj∧
∧
i<j
(y)i
)
∧ [y]j=pχjq
]
∨
[
¬ConT0(χj∧
∧
i<j
(y)i)∧ [y]j=p¬χjq
]]
.
Then the theory T is definable by the following Σn+1-formula
AxiomT(x) =df AxiomT0(x) ∨ ∃y
(
Compl (y) ∧ x=[y]ℓ(y)−1
)
,
where AxiomT0(x) =df AxiomPA(x) ∨ Πn−1-True(x).
Lemma 5. PA+ Σn−1-Sound (PA) ⊢ ∀z∃!y
(
Compl (y) ∧ [y]ℓ(y)−1∈{pχzq, p¬χzq}
)
.
Proof. Reason inside PA + Σn−1-Sound (PA) = PA + Con(T0). The existence of y will be
proved by induction on z.
• For z = 0, put y = 〈χ0〉 if ConT0(pχ0q) and y = 〈¬χ0〉 if ¬ConT0(pχ0q); note that
by Lemma 3 we have ConT0(p¬χ0q) in the latter case.
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• Now, if Compl (y)∧[y]ℓ(y)−1∈{pχzq, p¬χzq} then put y
′ = y 〈ˆχz+1〉 if ConT0+S(pχz+1q)
and y′ = y 〈ˆ¬χz+1〉 if ¬ConT0+S(pχz+1q), where S is the set {[y]0, · · · , [y]z} and ˆ de-
notes the concatenation operation. Note again that by Lemma 3, ConT0+S(p¬χz+1q)
in the latter case. It can then be easily seen that Compl (y′)∧[y′]ℓ(y′)−1∈{pχz+1q, p¬χz+1q}.
The uniqueness of y will again be proved by induction on z.
• For z = 0, if for some y and y′ we have Compl (y) ∧ [y]ℓ(y)−1 ∈ {pχ0q, p¬χ0q} and
Compl (y′)∧ [y′]ℓ(y′)−1∈{pχ0q, p¬χ0q} then if y 6= y
′ we should have either [y]0=pχ0q,
[y′]0=p¬χ0q or [y]0=p¬χ0q, [y
′]0=pχ0q. Then we must have ConT0(pχ0q)∧¬ConT0(pχ0q)
in both cases; contradictions.
• For z+1 assume that both Compl (y)∧ [y]ℓ(y)−1∈{pχz+1q, p¬χz+1q} and Compl (y
′)∧
[y′]ℓ(y′)−1∈{pχz+1q, p¬χz+1q} hold. Then, if for a sequence swe denote 〈[s]0, · · · , [s]j−1〉
by s ⇂ j, Compl
(
y ⇂ (z + 1)
)
∧ Compl
(
y′ ⇂ (z + 1)
)
holds, and so by the induction
hypothesis y ⇂ (z + 1)=y′ ⇂ (z + 1). Thus it remains to show that [y]z+1=[y
′]z+1.
If [y]z+1 6=[y
′]z+1 then either [y]z+1=pχz+1q, [y
′]z+1=p¬χz+1q or [y]z+1=p¬χz+1q,
[y′]z+1=pχz+1q, and then, just like before, ConT0
(
pχz+1∧
∧
i6z[y]iq
)
∧¬ConT0
(
pχz+1∧∧
i6z[y
′]iq) should hold in both cases; contradiction with y ⇂ (z + 1)=y
′ ⇂ (z + 1).
Lemma 6. PA+ Σn−1-Sound (PA) ⊢ Σn−1-Sound (T).
Proof. Reason inside PA+Σn−1-Sound (PA) = PA+Con(T0). Take 〈ψ0, · · · , ψl〉 to be any
sequence of the axioms of T0 and 〈ϑ0, · · · , ϑk〉 to be any sequence of formulas for which
there are 〈y0, · · · , yk〉 such that
∧
i6k
[
Compl (yi)∧[yi]ℓ(yi)−1= pϑiq
]
. By Lemma 5 all yi’s are
in initial segments of u = max{y0, · · · , yk}. So, all ϑi’s appear in the list [u]0, · · · , [u]ℓ(u)−1.
It follows from Compl (u) that ConT0(p
∧
i<ℓ(u)[u]iq), hence we have ConT0(p
∧
i6k ϑiq), so
Proof (u, p
∧
i6k ϑi ∧
∧
j6l ψj → ⊥q) can hold for no u. Now, since any sequence of the
axioms of T can be rearranged as 〈ψ0, · · · , ψl, ϑ0, · · · , ϑk〉 where ψj ’s and ϑi’s are as above,
Con(T) holds.
Therefore, PA+Σn−1-Sound (PA) ⊢ Con(T), and then our conclusion follows from the fact
that Σn−1-Sound (T) =df Con(T+Πn−1-Th(N)) = Con(T) since T+Πn−1-Th(N) = T.
Theorem 6. For any n ≥ 1, there exists a ∆n+1-definable and Σn−1-sound theory T
which proves self Σn−1-soundness: T ⊢ Σn−1-Sound (T).
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Proof. The theory T constructed above is Σn+1-definable, and since it is complete, it must
be Πn+1-definable as well. To see it more directly, note that for all j ∈ N
χj ∈ T⇐⇒ N  AxiomT0(pχjq) ∨ ∀y(Compl (y) ∧ j<ℓ(y)→ pχjq=[y]j).
Since χ0 = Con(T0) is consistent with T0 (i.e. N  ConT0(pχ0q)), then χ0 = Con(T0) ∈ T1,
and so T ⊢ Con(T0). Therefore, noting that Σn−1-Sound (PA) =df Con(PA+Πn−1-Th(N)) =
Con(T0) and PA ⊆ T, Lemma 6 implies that T ⊢ Σn−1-Sound (T).
4 Concluding Remarks
A special case of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem for Σn-soundness of PA follows
from the well-known facts on strong provability predicates and their modal logics (see e.g.
[1, 4]) and it could be extended to Σn-definable and explicit (provable) extensions of PA.
So, no Σn-definable, Σn−1-sound and explicit extension of PA can prove its own Σn−1-
soundness (Theorem 2—which generalizes Theorem 6 of [6]). We strengthened this result
by deleting the requirement of “explicit extension of PA” (Theorem 3). The optimality
of this result, in a sense, follows from the fact that a complete ∆n+1-definable and Σn−1-
sound theory (which is an explicit extension of PA) may prove its own Σn−1-soundness
(Theorem 6—which generalizes an example of [6] reconstructed in [7]).
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